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Introduction
in February 1994 tihe Working Group of the UNIDROIT in which the most
eminent legal experts of the 56 Member States of the UNIDROIT participated ')
completed its wotk of drafting a Model Law for International Comrnercial
Contracts.
As this Model Law is tihe result of harmonization of contract law between
Common Law countries and Civi1 Law countries, I am convinced that Indonesia
need not to "re-invent the wheel" by attempting another comparative study on
national Contract Laws and principles in order to arrive at a universally
recognized set of principtes for our Contract La]v and Law of Obligations, but
instead could benefit from the excellent wotk done by the UNIDROIT.
ln fact there was already such a (limited) comparattve law project conducted by
the National Law Refonn Agency (Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional - BPHN)
in 1994, conducted by a team of Indonesiari and foreign lawyers, which team I
chaired, which involved a cornparison between lndonesian Law Obligations,
                  '                                                           'Arnerican Law, Dutch Law and Austratian Law. '.
                                       'Never'theless my personal view is that the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts would be a better example, and would give higher,
universal recognition to the new Law of Obligations, including Law of Contract,
as the experts irtvolved in the UNIDROIT Working Group already represented a
very large proportion of the legal systems in the world, and consisted of the
most eminent, experienced and internationally recognized experts, not only in
'MicliaelJoacliiniBonell:PlliinteniationalRestatetnentofContractLaw,2"d.ed.,Trmisuational
Pablishers, Inc. IrvingtonLon-Hudson, New York 1997, p. 19-30.
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their own law, but also in the field of International Private Law and Comparative
Law.
It is therefbre, that fbr the sake of clarity the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (UPICCS) are discussed in this study,
because as we can see in Chapter 5, the Indonesian Academic Draft for a BM of
the Law of Obligations {which include the Law of Contract) has not yet adopted
a number of very important principles of the UNIDROIT Moqel Law such as for
'instance, the,principle ot Balance b.etween the Parties and of Protection of the
     'Weaker Party, Fair lnterpretation of Standard Contracts, Matters of non-
perfbmiance in changes of circumstances or other unsurmountal)le difficulties
to per[fbrm, Relief of responsibility in certain, speciiically named circumstances
and the 1ike, which are very important principles for parties of Developing
Countries, where the overall situation is not yet as stable and settled as in
Industriaily Developed Countries.
The Princi les of Commercial Contracts in UNIDROIT
In broad 1ines, UPICCs consists of seven Chapters, namely Chapter I: General
Stipulations; Chapter II, Drawing up of Contracts; Chapter III, Validity of
Contract; Chapter IV, Interpretation of Contract; Chapter V, Contents of
Contract; Chapter VI, Perfbrmance of Contract, and Chapter VII, Non
Per[fbrmance. The Seven Chapters are further detailed in 109 Articles. UPICCs
uses the method of "Restatemene as used by the ALI (Americari Law Institute),
that is by including the "black letter law", its comments.
It must be remembered that the principles are an effort to harnionize disparate
interests: those of developed and developing countries, of liberal and socialistic
countries, of common law and cMl law, that are applied tQ harmonize contract
law trans-nationally. Considering the many regulations, and without ignoring
other stipulations, the writer wi11 put forward several princtples that can be
related to the renewal of contract law.
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1. The Prinei le ofFreedom to Enter into Contract
a. TheFreedomtoDecideontheContentsoftheContract
The first piUar of Contract Law is the fireedom to enter into contract. The
principle to enter into contract has also been formulated by UPICCs by
providing a "reorientation to a new paradigm" in line with the existing social-
economic disparities of today. The principle of freedom to enter into contract is
simply formulated in UPICCs iri article 1.1, with the statement that :" the
parties are free to enter into contract and decide on its contents". To this are
given 3 comments, namely: (1) The freedom to enter into contract as a basic
principle in international commerce; (2) economip sectors that do not offer
competition are an exception; and (3} party autonomy is provided with
compulsory regulations.
There is an effbrt here to place the principle of freedom to enter into contract
proportionally in various social situations.
Firstly, the principle of freedom to enter into contract is of top interest in
international trade. It is the right of each businessman to freely decide on
whom he wishes to offer his goods or services to, and from whom he wishes to
receive supplies. Also, the opportunity to freely determine on the conditions of
each transaction, forms a cornerstone of an open international'economic
                                                                'system,thatismarketorientedandcompetitive.  .
Secondly, There are a number of exceptions in the prineiple of freedom to enter
into contract. There are economic sectors that are the authority of the state to
decide on behalf of public interest, which form exceptions to free and open
competition. In this case, for example, certain goods or services may be
requested from a designated supplier only, which is usually a public body, and
who may or may not be allowed, under certain obligations, to enter into
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contract with whoever so requests, but is lirnited only to available supply of the
goods or services.
Thirdly, ffparty autonomy with rnandatory rules". Related to the freedom to
decide on the eontents of the contract, in the first instance UPICCs has
provided stipulations that may not be ignored by the parties (for exarnple Article
1.5 on the "exclusion ony modhication by parties"). Furfhermore, there are public
and private regulations that are mandatory as enacted by the state (such as
Anti-1teust Law, The Law on the Control of Foreign Exchange and Price, and .
Iaws that give certain obligations or prohibit conditions in the contract that are
                                                 'considered not fair in general, that are meant to protect the consumer. etc}.
These can validate the regulation contained in the Principles (which is
specifically regulated in Article 1.4 on "Mandatory Rules").
b. TheFreedomtoDeterminetheFormofContract
As a manifestation of the freedom to enter into contract, UPICCs stipulates the
principle of simplicity in forming a contract. In principle, a contract need not
be vvritten. Article 1.2. states that `in Ul?ICCs there is no obligation that a
contract must be in unittenform or must be proven in u?riting. The existenee ofa
contract may he proven through dt£ferent means, including through witnesses".
This stipulation means that (1) As a rule a Contract is not subject to formal
conditions; (2) Exceptions are possible based on the law enforced; (3) conditions
of form of contract that are agreed by the parbies, are also possible.
In princlple, UPICCs does not prescribe anything regarding the form of a
contract. Although this principle refers to the written contract, but it may be
extended to other conditions of contract. The condition also covers
modfications and termination of contract by agreement of both parties. This is
ari irnportant princtple in the context of international commercial relations, as,
considering modern communications systems, transactions are made very
rapidly and not based on paper documents. The first sentence in this principle
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takes into consideration the fact that some legal systems consider fopmal
eonditions as a substaritive issue, while others stress only the evidence. The
second sentence is meant to clarify that accordmg to the principle of freedom to
use any form, this also includes the validity of or:al evidence in court procedure.
                                                            'UPICCs gives allowance for certain national laws that prescribe specified forms
of contracts. An exarnple is the contract on the rights of land in Indonesian law.
In this case, the freedom to form a contract is modfied by the law in force as
Indonesian law prescribes that contracts concerning land (especially wit
foreigners) should be in writing. National or international law may make an
exception of certain conditions, such as on the form related to the entire
contract as well as to the individual conditions (for instance agreements on
arbitration or jurisdiction clauses). ln fact, the parties may agree on a speeial
forrn for the closure, modfications or termination of their contract.
c. AContraetisBindingasLevvv
UPICCs states the principle that a contract that is made on the basis of
agreement by both parties is binding. Article 1.3. states that `fA Contract that is
leqally valid is hin{ling to the parties. A oontract may only be mod±Lfied or
terrninated accorzling to the conctitions laid cictun bg agreement or as stipulated in
these principles." This formulation contains several princip!es, namgly (1) the
Principle of Ptzcta Sunt Servanda; (2) Modifica:tions; (3) and the Effect of
                                                                        '        'Contract on a third, unrelated party.'
                       '
Firstly, tihis Principle lays down the basic principle in contract law, namely that
ofpacta sunt servanda. The binding nature of a contractual agreement clearly
indicates that an agreement has been clearly entered into by the parties, and
that such agreement wil1 not be marred by any Megalities. Additional
stipulations on closure of a legal contract may be found in national or
international regulations that are valid and mandatory.
                 '
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Secondly, a reasonable result of the prineiple of pacta sunt servada is that a
contract may be modified or terminated at any time by agreement of the parties.
Modification oT termination without agreement is contraiy to this exception and
is acceptable only when it is in accordance with the conditions of contract or
when this is clearly regulated in the Principles.
Thirdly, Whilst as a rule, a contract affects only those parties entering tihe
contract, in certain instances, however, it may occur that it wiil also affect a
thrd party. Therefore, a vendor, who on the basis of domestic law, may have
the contractual obligatien to protect the phy$icai integrity of a certain good, is
so obliged not only towards the buyer but also towards others with hirn at the
place of sale. Similarly, a consignee of a cargo company has the right to sue the
canier for non-pei fbrmance, when the carrier is bound to the contract through
the sender. Based on the principle that bind the parties, this article does not
ignore the eifects to a third party, that may artse from the contract, based on
the law in force. Nso, these principles do not ignore the effects of cancellation
or termination of contract on the right of third pardes.
d. Mandatory Rules as Iixceptions
UPICCs allcrws for mandatory rules that arise from domestic law, as wen as
from international law that may harnper the freedom of entering into ¢6ntract.
Article 1.4 states tihat "in theseprinct'ples there is no stipulation that must limit
the impleinentation oj' manclatory rules, that an'se .from nationaL inter:national or
supra-nationat regulations, that are amplied according to the regulations in the
nelevant civt'l code". There are four basic principles in this formulation. These
are: (1) Mandatory Rules that are in force; (2) Mandatory rules that are in force
only when the Princtples are included in the Contract; {3) MandaSory Rules may
be enforced when the Principles are the law that regulate contracts, and (4)
Reference is made to the relevant international civil law pertaining to each case.
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Firsrtly, By mentioning the special nature of these principles, nevenheless, it
should not be interpreted that they ignore mandatory rules, arising from
national, international or supra-national laws. ln other words, rnandatory rules
that are the law in the countries as an implementation of international
conventions, or adopted by supra-national organizations, may not be ignored by
these principles.
Secondly. In the case where these Principles are considered having been
included in the contract on the basis of agreement by the parties, then the
Principles wil1, in the first place, harmonize the mandatory rules that regulate
contracts. For exarnple, these principles will bind the parties only for as long
they do not affect regulations that are in force, where the parties are not
allowed to igriore these regulations through contract. Funhermore, mandatory
rules on forum, and possibly also third countries, wili also be enforced, on
condition that they apply to any law regulating contraet, and in the case of
third country regulations, that there is a close relation between the countries
and the contract being made.
Thirdly, however, in the case of a dispute being brought to arbitration, where
these Principles apply as the applical]le law regulahng eontracts, then these
principles can stin not ignore the application of mandatory rules where the
agpplication of cornplaint is separated from that where the larw is enforced aois
d'apptication necessairoj. Exarnples of mandatory rules, and the application of
rules that may not be ignored by choosing other laws, may be found in the area
                                                                   ''regulating foreign exchange, Import-E)rp.ort licensing, regulations on restrictive
               '                            '                      ''
Fburthly, The court and arbitration differ widely on the manner of application
of mandatofy rules pertaining to international commercial contracts, For that
reason, this chapter avoids to consider several issues related to this problem,
especially on whether as a complement, mandatory rules on forum and of lex
contractus of third parties must also be taken into consideration. And if so, in
11
!
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how im and based on which criteria These problerns are solved in accordance
wit[h the rules of international private law, relevant to each case.
Therefbre, UPICCs stipulation basicaliy regulates those areas of contract law
Chat are within the purview ofparty autonomy. This contains rules that not
only regulate but that are also mandatory. Article 5.1. mentions that "the
parties may ignore the application qf these pn'nctPles or divert or modt:t[tr the
validity gf each rule, except when, otherwt'se determined in these. Ptinciples".
Therefbre, tihere are three main elements related to the existence of UPICCs,
narnely: (1) the Prineiples are non-mandatory in nature; (2) Ignoring or
changing these may be done openly or tacitiy; (3) '[here are, however,
mandartory rules in the Principles to be observed.
Firstly, Rules contained in the principles in general, are not mandatory, for
instance, the parties may in each separate case ignore their application in total
or in part or change the contents to adjust to the princtples in accordance to
the needs of the special kind of transactipn involved.
Secondly, Ignoring or changing the principles by the parties may be done
openly or tacitly. Ignoring and changes are rnade tacitly when the conditions to
be made have been individually negotiated or become part of standard
condhions that are incfuded in their contract by the parties. When the parties
clearly agree to apply only several chapters of the Principles,- {for example, only
on the per fbrmance or non-perforniance of the contract, then the Principles of
UNIDROIT are valid),- then it is understood that the Chapter invokwed will be
                                              'enforced together with the general principles mentioned in Chapter 1.
                                             '
Thirdly, There are several stipulations in the Prindiples that are compulsory in
nature, for instance, the importance mentioned in the Principles, when the
parties are not allowed to ignore or divert from the Principles according to their ･-
own wil1. Given the nature of the Principles, the non-adherence to this
perception has no consequence. On the other hand, it needs to be noted that
stipulations that are being used refiect the standard of behaviour and rules that
f
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are compulsory in nature based on most national laws, The Stipulations that
are compulsory in nature are usually so stated.
For example, Artricle 1.7 on good falth and fair dealing, with stipulation in
Chapter 3 on substaritive validity, except insofhr as these stipulations are
connected or contain errors and mitial impossibmaty (see Article 3.19). Further
Article 5.7 (2) on the determination of price, and Article 7.4.13 (2) on agreed
compensation for non-performance of contract, An exception is when the
compulsory nature of a stipulation taeitly follows the contents and purpose of
that stipulation {See article 7.1.6).
e. The rnternational Nature and Purpose ofUPICCs to be kept in mind
at their Interpretation
ll
As stated in Chapter II, "lex mercatoria" is a law that is uniform or in harmony
with the laws of each country. This is also the wish of UPICCS. Article 1.6 says
that cr in the interpretation qf these princt'ples, attention must be gtven to the
interruitional nature and the puir)osq inctuding the neecls to promote uniformity
in theirimplementation"XMiat then needs to be noted are: (a) the Interpretation
of the Principles in reverse to the interpretation of contract; (b) Consider their
international nature; (c) the Purpose of the Principles; and (d) that there are
additional stipulations to the Principles.
Firstly, As in each legal text that is legislative or contractual in nature, the
                                                     'Principles may cause uncertainty regarcling their exact' meaning. The'
interpretation of these principles wi11 differ from the contract that the parties
apply. Even when the principles are understood to be binding to the parties
only at the contractual leve!, for example, where their application is dependent
on the individual contracts, then these principles stil1 form a set of
autonomous regulations that are valid, in order that they may be uniformly
applied to a number of contracts of different kinds, and are in force in many
                                'parts of the world. As a consequence, these piinciples must be interpreted
different to such terms as used in each contract. Rules on their interpretation is
i
                                                                     37
    regulated in Chapter 4 of the Principles. This Chapter is concerned with the
    mamer how the Principles must be interpreted.
    Seeondly, The first criteria in the interpretation of the Principles, as regulated
   by this article, are their "internatiDnal nature". This means that the terms and
    concepts contained therein, must be interpreted autonomously, (for instance, in
    connection with the Principles thernselves), and not refer to meanings as are
   traditionally understood in certain domestic laws. This approaeh becomes
   important, considering that the Principles are the results of cornparative studies
  ･ made by legal experts coming from various legal backgrounds and from divgrse
   cultural environments. When they formulated each stipulation, these experts
   were forced to find a legal lariguage that is suMcientiy neutral, in order that
   they could reach the same understanding. Even iri the exceptions where the
   terms or purpose have never been u$ed in their traditional meaning.
   Thirdly, by stating that in the interpretation of the Principles one must note
   their purpose, this article clarifies, that the Principles are not interpreted
   rigidly and to the letter, but must be seen in the frarnework of their purpose
   arid in the rationale found in each stipulation, as is also found in the Principles
   as a whole. T[he Purpose of each stipulation can be known, both through the
   text itseif and from the comments on the stipulations. As to the purpose of the
   Principles as a whole, this article clarifTies tihat, the main purpose of the
   Principles is to provide a uniform frameworik for international commercial
   contracts, and finnly refers to the need to promote their uniform application.
   For example, by giving assurance that in practice, the Principles offer the
   widest possible interpretadon and are unifomiy applied in diverse countries.
   See further Article 1.7, which, although addressed to the pardes, may also be
   included in the purpose of the Pririciples to inVestigate good faith and fair
   dealing in the context of contractual relations.
   Fourthly, a number of issues that should have been included in,the Prin¢iples
   are, however, not distinctly regulated. To determine whether or not issues are
,,･･
 within the purview of the Principles, despite the fact that they are not being
1f
:
[
I
l
l
l
l
;
1
/
/'
:
j
!1
/1
                                                                        38
  clearly thus regulated, or whether they fal1 outside of it, it should first be
  determined whether or not these are clearly stated, either in the text andlor in
  the comments.
  The need fbr uniformity in the application of the Principles means that
  whenever there is this gap, then a solution must be found, wherever possible, in
  the Principles themselves, before domestic law is used. The first step to a
  solution for unsoived questions is to apply an analogy on certain stipulations.
  Therefore, Article 6.1.6 on the Place of Pembrrnance, should also have regulated
  the problem of Compensation. Similarly, stipulations in Article 6.1.9 that relate
  to the problem of financial obligatioris expressed in a foreign currency other
  thaii the one where payment is made, should also include financial obligations
  that may be expressed in financial units, such as SDR (Speeial brawing Rights),
  or ECU (European Currency Unit). When, however, a problein can not be
  solved by extension of the stipulation through analogue cases, then solution
  may be sought in the underlying general principles. Several of these basic
  principles are clearly stated in the Pripciples. Others, however, must be found
  in the special considerations, for instance, where regulations must first be
  analyzed to see whether the stipulations may be considered as a statement of a
  general principle, and may also be applied to the case other than that which it
  specfically regulates.
  The parties are of course at liberty to agree on certain national laws that may be
  referred to, to complement the Principles. This stipulation may read as' follows:
  "Zhis contract is raled bg the UmoROJ l' Principtes and complemented un'th laws
  .from countTy fX", or "Tla's contract must be interpreted and implemented in
' accordance with the UIVIDROJT Mnciptes, while matters not ctearig solved
  through thesq may he sotved in accordance to the laws oj' country X".
/1
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' 2. The Princi le of(ibod Faith and Fair Dealin
'
'
The second pMar of Contract Law is the principle of good faith and fair dealing.
The two principles must become the basis of the entire contract, from the tme
of negotiation to its perfbrmance and termination of contract. Article 1.7 says
that (1) iri international commerce, each party must act accordmg to the
principle of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) that the parties may not ignore
or lirnit this responsibthty. Apcording to the "restatement" of this,article, there
                                '   'are three essential points in the principle of good faith and fak dealing. These ･
'are: (1) "good falth and fair dealingl as a basic, underlying concept of the
Principles; (2) that in international trade, there is a specinc interest in the
pnhciple of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) there is a mandatory element in
the principle of good faith and fair dealing.
/
/
Firstly, there are a number of stipulartions in the entire chapter, that differ from
the Principles, that contain the direct or indirect application of the principle of
good faith and fair dealing. This means that geod faith and fair dealing is
considered as one of the most basic ideas that underlie the Principles. To state
in the general conditions that each party must act according to the princtples of
good faith and fair dealing, paragraph (1) of this article clarifies that, although
ttiere are no specdic stipulations in the Principles, on the behaviour of the
parties during the entire process of the contract, including during the process
of negotiation, nevertheless, the parties must act in accordance with the
principles of good faith and fair dealing.
Secondly, Reference made to the "principle of good faith and fair dealing in
international trade", is meant firstly to clarify, that in the context of the
Principles, tihese two concepts are not applied similar to their usual application
in national legal systems. In other words, domestic standards may be
considered only as long as they are generally acceptable among dfferent legal
systems. Furthermore, implications of the formula thus used mean, that the
principle of good faith and fair dealing must be interpreted in the frarnewotk of
special conditions in international trade. Standard business practice may differ
:;
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from one trade sector to the other, and even within one sector may differ more
or less, depending on the social and economic environment where the company
does its business, the company's size, technical capabhities, etc.
It must be noted that when referring to the Principles andlor comments on
good faith and fair dealing, such reference is related to "good faith and fair
dealing in international trade" as specined in this article.
Thirdly, The responsibility of the parties to act according to the principles of
good faith and fair dealing forms a basic nature, meaning that the parties may
not by contract ignore or limit this principle (clause (2)}. On the other hand, it
does not prevent the parties to include in their contract, the responsibMty to
seek improved quality of behaviour.
F
1
1
3. The Princi le ofReeo nizin :toeal Usa e in Business Transactions
ll
[
l
i
i
l
I
l
l
i
As stated by Wir)'ono Proqjodikoro in the Draft Law that he pr(rposed, that one
of the principles that rnust be noted in drafting the new Contract Law is the
pimciple of Usage and Custom. It appears that UPICCs has also included the
principle in application of local usqge. Article 1.8 that regulates Usage and
Practices states that (1) The parties are bound by each usage that they have
agreed upon and by each practice that is in force among them; and (2) that the
parties are bound by usage that is widely known or routinely in use in
international commerce by parties engaged in a particular trade, except whe.n
such usage is unreasdnable.
This stipulation contains six important main elements , namely: {a) Practices
and usage in the context of the Principles; (b) Practices in use among or
between the parties; (c) Usage that has been agreed upon; (d) Other usage in
force; (e) the Application of unreasonable usage; and (D usage that ignores the
Principles.
/
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Firstly, this article lays down the principle that the parties are, in general,
bound by practices and usage that meet such conditions as regulated in this
article. Further, these sarne conditions must be met in practice, and usage to
be applied to each case and for such purpose as clearly memiongd in the
Prineiples.
Secondly, a practice that is in use between the parties in a certain contract is
automatically binding, except when the parties specifically mention. to ignore
                                                  'such use. Whether or not a practice is "in use" between the parties wi11
nafurally depend on the situation in each case. However, a behaviour that was
found only once in a previous transaction between the parties is not deerned
sucacicrrt.
Thirdly, by stating that the parties are bound by the usage that they have
agreed upon, clause (1) of article 1.8. merely validates the general.principle
regarding entering into contract as regulated in article 1.1. In fact, the parties
may negotiate all conditions of contract, or in specdic matters refer to sources
other than usage.
The parties may formulate the application of each usage, including such usage
normally used in the commercial sector, but that is not yet used by either of the
parties, or u$age related to other kinds of contracts. This makes it possible,
however, for the parties to agree on what is wrongly interpreted as "usage", as
for example to apply the term "usage" to a set of regulations drawn up by a
trade association, but which, in fact, only partially decides on general
behaviour.
Fourthly, clause (2) determines the criteria by which to identify usage that may
be applicable when no special agreement has been made by the parties. In fact,
usage must "be known in general and routinely experienced in the related
trade", and forms a condition for the application of usage at international,
national or local level. The next qualification that refers to "international
l
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       'commerce" is to avoid usage that is in use, and limited to domestic
transactions, to be requested to be applied to transactions with foreign partigs.
Only usage that is purely local or national in nature, may be applied without
special reference to it by the parties. Therefore, usage that is in force in the
exchange of certain commodities, or in trade exhibitions, or in harbours, is
applicable when sueh usage is routinely followed by foreign parties. Another
exception is related to the problem of a merchant who is bound in a number of
contracts in a foreign country, and is thus bound by such usage as are usually
applied in that country in similar contracts.
                                 '
  'Fifthly, a usage may be wen known to business people in general within a
given trade sector, but its application in a special case may be unreasopahle.
The reason for this may be found in certain situations where one or both parties
take actions that in themselves or by their nature are not normal in such
transactions. In this case, usage can not be applied.
Sixthly, Once the manner of transaction and usage are in force in the case
under consideration, then they ignore opposing stipulations included in the
Principles. The reason for this is because they are binding to the parties as
implicit conditions in their totality. It is as though they replace those conditions
that are spechically formulated by the parties, but by the same token, in their
application they ignore the Principles. Exceptions are made only for
                                                             'stipulationsthatarespeciallymentionedasmandatory. .･
4. The Princi le ofA eement throu h Offer and Acce tance and throu h
:
I
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Behaviour
In principle, agreement is reaehed through offer and acceptance. The Contract
Law of tihe Civi1 Code does not regulate these principles. On the contrary, the
UPICCs formulators considered the practical elements in the process to a
contract, because in this process win arise the contractual rights and
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responsibilities towards the making of the contract, that are based on the
principles of good iaith arid fair dealing. Anicle 2.1 of UPICCs states that "A
contract may he made either throtigh qCfer and acceptance or through the
hehaviour of the parties that shew that there exists an qgreement'. In short,
there are two main elements here, and these are: {1) offer and acceptance; or (2)
there is the behaviour showing that there exists an agreement between the
parties.
                                                              '' 'The basis for the UPICCs Principle is that an agreement between t[he parties is
suthcient,to make a contract. The concept of offer and acceptance is
traditionally used to determine "whether and when" the parties have come to an
agreement. The combination of the concqpt of "offer and acceptance" on the one
hand, and that of "behaviour" on the other, seems to indicate that the drafters
have tried to combine the Common Law concept with the Continental Law
concept of agreement. As e)rp1ained in this article and Chapter, the UNIDROIT
Principles used this c6ncept as its main tool of analysis.
In commercial transaction practice, contracts that entail complex transactions
are often formed only after long negotiations, without a spechied sequence of
offer and aceeptance. ln such a case, it may be difficult to determine the actual
time that the contractual agreement has been reached. According to this article,
a contract may be made although the actual time of agreement may not be
determined, as long as the behaviour of the parties indicate suff7iciently that an
agreement has been reached. In order to determine whether there is sufficient
ovidence as to the wishes of the panies to be tied to a contract, their behaviour
must be interpreted in accordance to the criteria set out in Article 4.1. etc.
In practice there ofren arise disputes as to when an offer has actually been
made. ln this case UPICCs has tried to define on what is meant by an "offbr".
Article 2.2 states that "A request to enter into a contract becomes an offer when
that effer sufficiently determines and shows that there is a wish of the offering
party to be tied to a contract when there is acceptance". Through this
definition, the term "offeff is differentiated from "other communication", where
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one party in the negotiation may take the initiative to draw up a contract. This
article therefore prescribes two conditions, namely that the request must
include (1) an agreement to close a contract only when there is acceptance, and
(2} show the wish of the offering party to be tied when there is acceptance.
Therefore, the basic elements are: (1) that there must be certainty of an offer,
and (2) there js a wish to be tied. Whenever a contract is made only through
offer and acceptance, further conditions must have been shown with due
certainty in the offer itsett Whether or not the offer complies witih these
conditions may be determined from the general conditions. More detailed
conditions may be mentioned, such as: {a) description of goods and services
and when these will be delivered or handed over; and (b) the price of the said
goods and services.
As regards the time and place of perforrnance, tihis may be left undecided in the
offer, without causing the o±fer to become less decidmg. Thus, this will al1
depend on: (a) whether or not the ollering party has seriously made an offer, (b)
whether the party to whom the offer is addressed wishe$ to enter into a firm
contract, and (c) whether conditions not mentioned in the contract may be
determined through interpretation of the language of the agreement, or is not
according to Article 4.1.etc, or refer to Article 4.8 or 5.2. This uncertainty may,
however, be soived by referimg to preceding practices or custom arnong the
parties (vide Article 1.8), or refer to other special regulations found in other
articles, as in Article 5.6 on Determining the Quality of Performance, 5.7 (On.
Pricing), 6.1.1 (on Time of Perfbrman¢e, 6.1.6 (on Mace of Perfbrmance), and
6.1.10 (on Currencies not explicitly mentioned). ･ '
The second criteria to determine whether or not a party has made an offbr that
leads to a contract, or whether he is merely opening negotiations, can be seen
from whether the party wishes to be tied when there is acceptance. This desire
is rarely stated explicitily, and must therefore be interpreted in each separate
case. The making of an othr {for example by firmly mentioning that this is "an
offer", or merely an "expression of a wish" becomes the first indication of the
4S
possibility of a wish, although it is not yet determining. Even more important,
however, is the contents and the addressee of the request. For most people, a
detailed and spechied request addressed to one person or persons in particular,
is usually meant as an offer, as compared to a request addressed to the general
public.
A request may contain all main conditions of a contract but stil1 does not tie the
                                                   'party giving the offer, despite it being accepted, if the request causes the closing
of contract to be dependent on several small points that are left open in the said
request.
An offer may also be withdrawn by the party making the offer. Ar'ticle 2.3 states
that (1) an offer becomes effective only when it reaches the party addressed to;
and (2) an offer, even in the case when it can not be withdrawn, may still be
withdrawn if the withdrawai reaches the addressee before' or at the time of
off;er. When is an offer effective? Clause (1} of this article that is literally taken
                                                                'from Article 15 CISG, determines that an offer beeomes effective at the time it
                                    'reaches the addressee.
The exact point in time when an offer becomes effective
pinpoints the moment when the addressee may accept the
tie the offbring party to the proposed contract.
is important,
offer, so that
 as lt
it wil1･
However, there may be other reasons why an offer in practice may be important
to be withdrawn. For, until such moment. the offering party is free to change
his mind and decide not to enter into a pontract, or replace his first offbr with a
second one, regardless whether the first bffer wi11 be withdrawn or not. [the only
condition here is that the party to whom the offer is addre$sed, must be
informed that the offering party wishes to make changes, even before, or at the
time that the addressee is informed of the first offer. Clause C2) of this article
differentiates between "withdrawal" and `revocation" of an offbr, as follows:
before an offer becomes effective, that offer may be revoked, while the problem
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whether or not it may or may not be withdrawn arises only atter that time (see
Article 2.4}.
Article 2.4 clause (1) confirms that until a contract is made, an offer may be
withdrawn if revocation is received by the person being offered, before it has
become an acceptance. However, an offer may not be revoked (a) when the offer
shows, both through confirmed time of receipt or through statement that the
offer may not be revoked; or (b) when the party oifered rightfully considers it as
irrevocable and that he has acted according to the offbr.
The question whether an offer may or may not be revoked, has traditionally
been a most controversial problem related to the drawing up of contract. As
long as there are no prospects of harmonizing the two disparate concepts in
their basic approach, i.e. in the different legal systems, namely the approach of
common law, where as a rule an offer may be revoked, and, conversely, the
approach made by most civii law systems, then only one approach can be
chosen as the main rule, and the other' as exception.
Clause {1) of this article, which has been literally taken over from Article 16
CISG states that unti1 the moment that the contract is made, then an ofTer, as a
rule that may not be revoked. However, the sarne clause mentions that a
revocation of an offer is subject to the condition that revocation reaches the
party offered, before the latter has confmned receipt. This happens only when
the party offered states orally that he has received the offer, or when the party
offered indicates to its agreernent by pefforming an action without informing the
offering party, on the rights of the offering party to revoke his offer at any time
unti1 the contract is signed (vide Article 2.6{3)). However, if the offbr is reeeived
through written confmnation, then the contract is closed at the time that the
acceptance is received by the offering party (see Article 2.6 (2}), when the right
of the offering party to revoke his offer has ended faster, that is when the
offered party has stated his acceptance. This manner of negotiation may result
in disadvantages to the offering party, who may not know whether he sti11 is, or
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is no longer in a position to revoke his offer. Yet, the party offbred is justified to
shorten the time for the offer to be revoked.
Clause {2) defines that there are two important exceptions to the general rule on
revocation of offer:, these are (1) if the offer indicates that it is ii trevocable, and
(2) if it was reasonable for thg offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocahle.
Article 2.4 clause (1) confums that unti1 a contract is concluded the offer may
be revoked if the revocation is received by the offeree or the person being
      'offered, before he has dispatched an acceptance. However, an offeT may not be
revoked (a) when the offer shows, both through confirmed time of receipt or
through statement that the offer may not be revoked; or (b) when the party
offered rightfully considers it as irrevocable and he has acted accordingly to the
offbr.
The question whether an offer may or may not be revoked, has traditionally
been a most controversial problem related to the closing of contract. As long as
there are no prospects of harmonizing the two disparate concepts in their basic
a[pproach, i.e. in the different legal systems, narnely the approach of offer, and
acceptance, and, corwersely, the approach made by most civi1 law systems,
based on agreement, then only one approach can be chosen as the main rule,
                                                                     'and the other is an exception.
    'Actions (of acceptance) made by the pat'ty being ofifered (offeree) may be in the
form of preparations for production, buying or renting goods or equipment,
laying out of expenses etc., as long as these actions are considered normal in
the related trade, or are normally expected, or are known by the offering party.
An ofTer is not always accepted, but an offbr inay be rejected. Article 2.5
mentions that "An offer is terminated when rejection is received by the offlering
party". Rejection inay be fir:nly mentioned or made in silence, but rejection is
one of the reasons for the terrnination of offer. An offbr is often rejected through
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a response that shows acceptance but with additions, 1irnitations or other
restrictions (see article 2.11{1)).
In the case where there is no firm rejection, then statements or behaviour of the
party offered must at all times convince the offering.party that the party offered
has no intention to accept the offer. An answer that merely asks for alternabyes
(for instance "can you reduce the price" or "can you send the goods earlierf), are
usually not sufficient evidence of rejection.
It must be remembered that rejection will cause the offer to be terminated,
disregarding the fact whether or not the offer may or may not be revoked, as
mentioned in Article 2.4.
Regulations on the mariner of acceptance are fbund in Article 2.6, that (1) A
statement made or the behaviour indicated by the party offered that show
acceptance to the offer, is considered an acceptance. Silence or inaction do not
by themselves mean acceptance; (2) Acceptance to an offer becomes effective
when indications of acceptance reach the offering party. (3) If, however, when
based on an offer or as a result of existing practice among the parties or by
custom, the offeree shows acceptance tihrough an action, despite not informing
the offeimg party, then acceptance becomes effective upon performance of the
action.
In order to show that there is acceptance, the party offered must,' by one or
other means, show "acceptance" to the offer. A mere information that the bfie.r
has been/ received, or to say that the offer is attractive, does not suffice.'
Funhermore, acceptance must be made without condition, meaning that
acceptance may not be made conditional to fUrther actions to be taken by the
offering party (for example "our receipt depends on your final acceptance"}, nor
by the party offered (for example " we herewith accept the conditions set out in
your memorandum and will endeavour to submit the contract to our Board for
their agreement within two weeks"}. Finally, the contents of acceptance should
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not include vaiiations on conditions offered, or at least not alter these
materially.
It is also ruled that, offer does not specify a special manner of acceptance.
Indication of acceptance may be made through firm statement as well as
through the implicit behaviour of the accepting party. Clau$e (1) of article 2.6.
does not provide details on the form of behaviour, but it may be assumed that
the behaviour is found in its perfbrmance, such as in. advance payment on
Price, shipment of goods, or commencing work at appointed place.
By stating that "silenee or inaction do not by themselves indicate acceptance",
clause (1) explains that as a rule silence or inaction do not indicate that the
offered party has accepted the offer. lhe situation becomes different if both
parties have agreed that silence means acceptance, or when there is a certain
way or custom that rules it thus. But if this has never happened, it is suficient
for the oliering party to state in his offer that the offer is considered accepted
when there is no response to the offer. While he takes the initiative to propose
tihe sigtiing of contract, the offered party is at 1iberty te accept or reject the otfer,
and may easily disregard the offer.
According to clause (2) acceptance becomes effectixre upon indication that
acceptance has reached the accepting party Cvide Article 1.9 (2)). On the
defmition on "reach" see Article 1.9(3). The use of tihe principle "receipt" is given
priority to the pnhciple of "sendmgl, because the onus of sending is on the
party offered rather than the offeiing party. This is because it is the fortner who
decides on the means of communications, and who knows whether the means
of communicatien chosen bears certain risks or deiays, and who can assure
that receipt reaches the addressee.
As a general rule, acceptance that is indicated merely through behaviour
becomes effective only when information on the matter is received by the
offering party. But it must be noted that special notification by the offered
party becomes necessary only when his behaviour does not by itseif explicitly
indicate acceptance to the offering party within a reasonable ime frame. In alt
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other matters, for instance when behaviour includes payments or shipment of
goods by air or other fast transportation, the sarne results may be reached
through the bank or transportation company who will inform the offering party
of the remittance of money or shipment of goods.
A general exception to this general rule of clause (2) of article 2.6. may be found
in the case mentioned in clause (3), namely that " on the bases of offbr or as a
result of general practice among the patties, or by custom, the offeree can show
acceptance through action, without informing the offeror party".
In this case, acceptance becomes effective when the action is perfbrmed,
without regard to whether or not the offering party has been properly informed.
Article 2.7 spechies the time of receipt. An offer must be received when the
offering party has asked for confirmation, or in the case when there are no
indications of time, through adequate time given, considering the situation,
includmg the speed of communication used. A verbal offer must be received
immediately, unless the situation showg otiherwise.
Witih respect to the period of time that an offer must be received, this clause,
which is in line with the second part of clause (2) of Article 18 CISG,
differentiates between verbal and written ofEer. A verba! offer must be received
immediately unless the situation shows differently. While, on a written offer,
everything depends on whether the offbr specifically mentions time of receipt. If
affirmative, then the offer must be received within that time frame, while in any
other matter, indications that there is acceptance must be received by the
offering party "in adequate tirne period considering the situation, including
communication facmaties used by the offering party".
It is very important to note that the regulations as mentioned in this article are
also valid in circumstances, where accordmg to Article 2.6(3), the olfered party
can show acceptance through action without inforrning the offering party: in
this case this becomes a perfbrnance that must be made within a speedic
ensuing time period.
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To determine the exact commencemeni of tirne frame set by Che offering party,
including calculation of holidays within that dme frame, can be seen in Article
2.8; while in the case of delayed receipt or delayed sending, see Article 2.9.c.
5. The Princi le on Prohibition to Ne otiate in Bad Faith
An important Princtple regulated by UMCCs is regardmg the extent of the
principle on good faith that is in force as from time of negotiation. Article 2.15
                                                                  ''regulates t2ie prohibition to negotiate in bad faith, by determining that : (1) A
                                                               'person is free to negotiate and is not responsible for the failure of reaching an
agreement; (2) However, a person in negotiation or who ceases negotiations in
bad faith is responsible for the losses suffered by the other party. (3) It is bad
falth, especially for someone to negotiate or continue to negotiate, when in fact
he has no intention to reach an agreement with the other party.
Basically there are three important.points to this rule, namely (1} the freedom to
negotiate; {2) Responsibility for negotititions made in bad faith; and (3) The
responsibdity for the failure of negotiation in bad faith. A "restatemene of these
three principles is explained by UPICCs, as fbllows:
Firstly, the parties are not only at liberty to decide when and with whom to
make negotiations towards a contract, but also when, in what manner, and the
time taken for the process of negotiation. These fbnow the principles of freedom
to enter into contract, as rnentioned in Article 1.1, and forms the basis to
guarantee healthy competition among international commercial enterprises.
Secondly, ir is the right of each party to freely make negotiations and to decide
on the condhions of negotiations, which is not without limits, as this must not
contravene with the principle of good faith and fair dealing, as regulated in
Article 1.7. An exainple of negotiation in bad faith as explained in clause (3) of
this article is when one party starts negotiations or conhnues to negotiate with
no intention to make an agreement with the other party. Another example is
:
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when one party, on purpose or by neglect, misleads the other party regarding,
among others, the identity or conditions of contract put forward, by providing
¢learly misleading facts and through the withholding of facts tihat should have
been given, on the identity of the parties and/or the contract. On the subject of
responsibility to guard confidentiality, see Article 2.16.
The responsibility of the party who negotiates in bad ialth is lmited to the
losses that he has incurred upon the other party (clause (2)). In other words,
the affected party may ask for compensqtion of expendimres made during
negotiations, and may also be indemnified for lost opportunity to enter into
contract with a third party (this is called interest on trust or negative interest).
However, in general he should not be asked to compensate for expected profit pf
the failed contract (known as interest on hope or positive interest).
Thirdly, the right to stop negotiations is also subject to the principle of good
faith and fair deaJing. When an offer has been made, then that offer may be
revoked only within a dme 1imit as speehied in article 2.4. Even before reaching
this stage, or when in the process of negotiations that do not follow the usual
sequence of offer and acceptance, then one of these parties is no longer free to
suddenly cease negotiations without duejustification. if no agreement can be
reached on this matter, then it will depend on the circumstances of the case.
Specdically until the other party, who, resulting from tihe behaviour of the first
party, puts forward sufficient reasons that may become the basis for further
negotiations, including all other matters related to the contract on which.
agreement has been reached by both parties.
6. The Princi le to Guard Confidentialit
During negotiation, company secrets may almost certainly be disclosed and,
therefore, wil1 be known to both parties. As a result, it is possible to rnisuse
such confidential information to one's own advantage. Article 2.16 regu14tes the
responsibdity to guard confidentiality. When information is provided in
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confidence by one of the parties during negotiation, then the other party has
the responsibthty not to divulge this iniiormation or misuse this to his interest,
whether or not the contract will or will not be signed later. When necessary,
such violation may be penalized or compensated on the basis ofprofit gained by
that party. Three points rnay be deduced from this regulation, namely: (1) that
the parties are basically not responsible to guard confidentiality; (2) there are
information that is confidential by nature; and (3) that losses may be
                                                   ''            ' 'Pirstly, only when there is no responsibMty to armounce, then panies in the
negotiation do not have the responsibility to treat exchanged information as
confidential. In other words, when one party is at liberty to decide which data
in the negotiated transactions masT be diselosed, then such information,
according to this regulation, is not confidential. Meaning, that it is information
that the other party may disclose to a third party or may use for himself, oven
though the contract may fai1.
Seeondly, one of the panies has an inferest that certain information provided
by the other party should not be divulged or used for otiher purposes, except
that for which it was provided. As long as that party clearly states that the
information provided is confidential, then the situation is clear, namely that by
receiving the information the other party is implicitly aware to treat the
inforrnation as confidential.
A problem may arise when the prohibition to disclose .information is considered
too long, which may contravene existing laws that prohibit business practices
that are hampering by nature. In fact, without such. statement the party
receiving the inforination may be buTdened by the confldentiality. Because,
facing the nature of the information or professional qualifications of the parties,
that responsibdity will be opposed to the general pimctple ef good faith and fair
dealing, when the party receiving the information discloses the information or
uses such information for his personal interest when negotiations are cancelled.
!
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Thirdly, Violation on the principle of confidentiality includes the regulation on
first responsibility on losses. The amount of loss to be compensated may vary,
depending on whether the parties have made a special agreement on whether or
not to disclose information. Even when the adversely affected party does not
$uffer any losses, he has the right to ask for compensation from the party
violating this agreement. This is to be taken from the gains the latter has
reeeived as a result of disclosing such information to a third party, or has
misused it for his own advantage. When necessary, even when the information
has not yet been diselosed or is only partially disclosed, then the disadvantaged
party may ask for ari irljunction based on existing laws.
7. Thekinci le o£ProtectinheWeak inCo tractswi hStandard
   Conditions
As mentioned al)ove, standard contracts form a source of "lex mercatoria". The
practice of using standard conditions is common in the business world,
including in Indonesia.
Article 2.19 determines that: (1} When one or both parties use standard
condhions in a contract, then goneral conditiens on the drawing up of a
contract are in force, and are subject to Article 1.10-1.11. (2} Standard
conditions are prepared specfications for general, as well as repeated use by
one of the parties, but clearly without having held prior negotiatioh with the
other party. This Article is the first of four articles (2.19-2.22), that regulate
special situations where' 6ne of both parties use stahdard conditions in drawing
up a contract.
"Standard conditions" must be seen as specdications of contract that are
prepared for general and repeated use by one of the parties and are in fact used
without prior negotiation with the other party (clause (2). The determining
factor in tihis case is not its formal appearance (for example that the standard
conditions are contained in a separate document or in the contract document
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itselfi whether they are printed or stored in a computer, etc), it is also not the
question of who has prepared these standard canditions (the party itseng the
trade association, or professional association). Also, the question is not the
contents (whether the conditions contain a set of cornplete rules covering
almost all aspects relevant to the contract, or contain only one or two
specMcations on exceptions on responsibility or arbitration). What is important
here is the fact tihat the standard conditions are cleariy decided by one party
only, without prior negotiation witih the other party･. [hese 1ajter were
previously only concerned with standard conditions that the other party must
                                                 'accept in its totality, while other conditions in the same contract may be
                                     '                          'negotiated.
In practice, general conditions in the drawing up of a contract are in force
without regard whether one or both parties use standard conditions or not
(clause (1)). This determines, that general conditions that are proposed by one
party are binding to the other party only when accepted, depending on the case
whether both parties have agreed only to those conditions that are explicitly
mentioned or also include those that aire implicitiy understood. On the other
hand, standard conditions that are contained in a separate document must be
clearly mentioned by the party who wishes to use those conditions. The tacit
use of such conditions may, however, be recogriized when this has been the.
practice arnong the parties or is a coinmon custom. See Article 1.8.
                             'Article 2.20 regulates that whenever there are unusual "conditions", by
specifying:(1) that no condition contained in the general conditions that are by
nature unacceptable to the other partsr will become effective, unless that
condition is e)rplicitly accepted by the other party; and (2) in order to detemiine
vihether a condition contains that nature it must be seen from its contents,
lariguage and presentation.
The elernents of this spechication may be divided into four categories, narnely
that: (1) Unusual conditions in general.conditions are not effective; (2)
Conditions may be "unusual" in its contents: {3) Conditions that are "unusual"
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   in their language and presentation; and (4) Explicit acceptance of "unusual"
   conditions. Below follow comments on the four categories.
   Firstly, a party that accepts general conditions as given by the other party, is
   in principle bound by them, regardless whether or not the party is aware of all
   the details, or has, or has not clearly understood the consequences o'f the
   conditions. There is, however, an important Exception to tihis rule, namely
   that, however much these general conditions have been accepted in their
   totality, nevenheless, the related party is,not bound to the conditions when
･ their contents, language or appearance are of a nature that is reasonal)ly
   unacceptable to him. The reason for this exception is to avoid a party from
   using standard conditions in order by misusing his advantaged position to
   surreptitiously force the conditions on the other party, who would have rarely
   accepted such conditions, if he was aware of them. For other articles that aim
   to protect the economically weak and less experienced, see Articles 3.10 and
   4.6.
   Seeondly, a condition that is included in the standard conditions may be found
   to be unusual because of its contents. This happens when tihe contents in such
   condition is normally not found in standard conditions in similar instances. To
   determine whether or not a condition is normal, one must study, on the one
   hand, conditions that are normally in use in this particular commercial sector,
   and negotiations that are normally in use between the parties. For this reason,
   a condition that, for･example, excludes or limits contractual responsibilities on
･ the part of the proposing party, may or may not be considered "unusual" and
   thus become ineffective in that particular case, where its effectiveness dePends
   on whether such conditions are considered normal in that particular trade
   sector, and whether it is consistent with what is normal practice among the
   parties in the negotiation.
   Thirdly, another reason for a condition contained in the general conditions to
   be considered unusual by the party'invokeed, may be on account of its written
   lariguage, which may not be clear, contain misprints, as for instance, in the
                                                                  57
case of minutes of meetings. In order to determine whether or not this has
happened, consideration need not be given to the formulation and presentation
normally used in the typing of standard conditions, but more to on the
professional expertise and experience of the party involved. Then, particular
words may be both clear and unclear at the same time, depending on whether
the related party has the same profession as tihe party using the standard
conditions.
Language may also play an important role in international trade. When'
     'standard conditions are formulated in a foreign language, then several
conditibns may be considered unusual to the related party, despite the fact that
they are clearly expressed in the condhions themseives, as the related party
does not nornially expect having to accept the consequences of such conditions.
Fourthly, the risks that are expected to be taken by the related party who is to
be bound to unusual conditions wil1 disappear, as long as they are openly
discussed, and when the other party notifies the related party on these
conditions and he then accepts the coriditions. This Article specifies that then
the parties wi11 no longer base their agreement on the "unusual" nature of the
eondhion, but on the fact that both parties have clearly agreed on the condition.
In practice there are often conflicts between "standard conditions" and non-
standard conditions" that have been agreed upon. Article 2.21 determines that
"in the case of conflict between stahdard conditions and non-standard
conditions, then it is the latter that is valid".
Standard conditions are defined as spechications that have been prepared by
one party and incorporated in the contract without prior discussion by the
part]ies (see Article 2.19(2)). It is logical that when the parties specially negotiate
and agree on specincations in a given contract, then these specMcations will set
aside such standard conditions that oppose these, when these conditions better
reflect the wishes of the parties in the case.
58
i
Specifications that are separately agreed upon, may appear in the same
document as the standard conditions, but may also be included in a separate
document. In the first instance, it wil! be more difficult to differentiate between
the conditions that are standard and which are not, and to determine the
position of hierarchy of the different documents. In this casg, the parties will
often clearly include specdication of contract, and which documents form part
of the contract, as well as their individual value.
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A special problem may arise when changes on standard conditions are only
agreed upon orally, without crossing out specifications that oppose the
standard conditions, whereas, those conditions specfically regulate the
exclusive nature of any written notes that are signed by the parties, or where
additions or changes in contents must be made iri wiiting. On this case see
Article 2.17 and 2.18.
Article 2.22 regulates the case when there are confiicting forms, meaning when
both parties put forward forms or standard conditions. When both parties use
standard forms and have agreed on exceptions on standard conditions, then a
contract may be made on conditions agreed, whose contents are as per normal,
except when one party has shown, or 1ater without undue delay informs the
other party, that he has no wish to be bound to the contract.
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There are three situations that are regulated here, these are: {1) whep both
parties use separate standard conditions; (2) "the conflict of forms" is ･linked to
                                                                  ''the general regutlations on .offer and acceptance; and (3) when the doctrine of
                                          tt         '-'"knock-ouV is used.
Firstly, ir often happens in commercial transactions, when both the offering
party as well as the accepting party, each refer to their own standard
conditions. In the case when there is no clear acceptance on the offering party
of conditions put forward by the accepting party, then the question arises as to
what is the contract based upon, and which standard conditions are in effect.
:
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Secondly, Whenever general conditions of offbr and acceptance are applied,
tihen there is no contract, when the acceptance by the offered party, -as
exception mentioned in Article 2.11{2),- is accompanied by a counter-offer, or
when both parties have started acting on the agreement without stating any
objections to the other's standard conditions. In this case it is considered that
a contract has been made, based on conditions that were sent last or last
referred to, which is known as the last-shot doctrine.
Thirdly, the last-shot doctrine rnay be correctly applied when the parties clearly
show that the use of their standard conditions are a requisite to the contract.
On the other hand, when the parties, as often happens in practice, refer to their
standard conditions almost automatically, for example, through the exchange of
printed orders, and information on order forms with conditions printed on its
back, then neither may be aware of any discrepancies existing between their
conditions. In this case, then there are no reasons to allow the parties to
dispute the contract. Or, when action has been taken, to force the validation of
the last shot conditions.
This is the reason why this article determines that, despite it being regulated in
the general specifications on offer and acceptance, but when the parties have
agreed on exceptions to standard conditions, it must be on those conditions
that are considered normal (or known as the knock out doctrine).
Howover, one of the parties may always put aside the knock-out doctrine, by
earlier expressing, or later, but without undue delay inform the otiher party,
that he does not wish to be bound to a contract that is not based on his own
standard conditions.
8, Princi lesRe ardin ConditionsfbrValidit ofContract
On this matter, the writer wi11 not discuss all considerations regarding
conditions for the validity of contract according to UPICCs. What needs to be
underlined here is that UPICCs does not regulate the validity of contract as
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contained in Article 1320 of the Indonesian Civil Code. The reasons for this are
confumeq in Article 3.1. that state that the Principles do not regulate the
invalidity of contract that arise from :
(a) inabraty; (b) non possession of authority; and (3) immbrality and Megality.
                       '                                  'This article confmns that not all reasons for the invalidity of contract as found
in several national legal systems are used in the context of the Priiiciples. The
reason for this exception is the complexity that arises from problem of status,
agency and public poliqy and the extreme differences that exist on the manner
how the issue is treated in domestic law. The result is that, issues such as ultra
vires, that is the fact of an agency going beyond its authority, or whether a
director has the authority to bind the company, and the contents of an immoral
and Megal contract, are regulated funher in the laws that are in force.
The validity of contract that is regulated by UPICCs is solely based on the
aspect of agreement, because this principle basically regulates only the
mechanism of agreement made by the parties as founded on the freedom to
enter into contract. The fonowing discussion will highlight only outstanding
specfications that are not yet regulated in the Civi1 Code.
An issue that is important to discuss is article 3.3. of the Principles that
regulates the situation of "mitial impossibility". The article says that: (1) The
mere fact that at the tirne of conclusion of tihe contract, the perfbrmance of the
obligation assumed was impossible, does not affeet the validity of the contract.
And that (2} The mere fact that at the time of conclusion of the contract 6nq
party was/not 'e'ntitled･to' disp'ose of the assets invoived in the contract, does
not, by itself affect the validity of contract.
The contract is valid even when the assets involved in the contract were already
destroyed at time of contract, with the consequence that the impossibility of
execution from its onset is equal to the impossibmaty that 'will happen after the
contract is made. The rights and responsibility of the parties aiise from the
inabMty of one party (or maybe of both parties) to peiform that which according
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to regulations is tantamount to non-performance. Arx example is when an
obligor has known of the impossibdity of performance even at forming of
contract.
Clause (1) also elminates the possibility of doubt, such as on the validity of
contract to deliver prospective goods. if the initial impossibdity is caused by
legal prohibition (as an export or import embargo), then the yalidity of contract
will depend on whether, based on such legal prohibition, the contract rnust be
cancelled or whether'it .prohibits qnly its implementation. Clause (1} even
deviates from regulations found in several civil legal systems that state that the
object bf the contract rnust be made possible. This clause also deviates from
the same regulations that state that there is an "authority", who because of
mitial impessibruty, ..... While Article 3.2 clause (2) of this artiele regulates
cases where one party has prornised to move or deltver goeds, while, at time of
forming the contract, he has no right of deliyery, title nor !egal rights on the
goods nor its dMsion.
Several legal system further state, that'a contract on buying and selling that
has been made under such conditions is nun and void. But, in the case of
mitial impossibihty, and even for stronger reasons, clause (2) of this article
considers such a contract valid. In fact, as often happens, one party may
receive legal title, or authority to take out goods after the contract is made. If
this does not occur, then the rules on non-performance will come inte force,
The authority not to take out goods muSt be differentiated from the inabdity to
do so. The latter concerns the inabMty of a person to p.erform, that caii affect all
or at least several types of contracts that he has made, however, that is beyond
the scope of the Princtples. See Article 3.1 (a>.
The Principles also determine tihe possibi!ity of cancellation of contract when
there are mistakes, either on facts or on the law (article 3.4), mistakes in
expression or presentation (article 3.6), the opportunity to correct non-
performance caused by mistakes (article 3.7); ...(article 3.8) and threats (article
3.9).
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However, most important to discuss in fuil is the Principle regarding the
cancellation of contract based on gross disparity among the parties, which is
not found in the Indonesian ctvi1 Code.
9. The Princi le Re ardin the Possib!e CanceUation ofa Contract yvith
                                      ''  tLitgE!-lt2igEA!S!yi t
Basically, this Principle is an implementatibn of the Principle on Good Faith
and Fair Dealing and the Principle of Balance and Justice. It is based on the
fact that there are gross disparities in society. For this reason there is the need
for a regulatory system that can protect the parojr that is in a disadvantaged
position. Article 3.10 on Gross Disparity states that: (1) One of the parties may
cancel the contract or individual conditions of the contract at tirne of signing,
when the contract or conditions contain in it prcwide unreasonably excessive
                                     ''advantages to the other party.
Attention must be given to the following factors: (a) the fact that the other party
dishonestly profits from the dependence, economic difficulties or other urgent
needs, or through his extravagance; or through ignorance, ine)rperience or
unprofessionality at bargaining; and (b) the nature of the contract. (2) Based
on the request of the party that has the right to cancel, the court may adjust
the contract or the condition in accordance witih reasonahle commercial
standards and fair dealing. (3) The court may adjust the contract or the
conditions, on request of the party receMng the cancellation, as long as the
latter informs the other party of his exact request upon receiving the
information, but before the other party has acted according to the contract or
its conditions. Spechications in Article 3.13 (2} are in force accordingly.
This stipulation contains three factors, namely {1) excessive profit; (2)
uajustified profits as a result of (a) unbalanced bargaining position, {b) the
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nature and airns of contract, and (c) other factors; and
adjustments.
(3) cancellation or
Iitirstly, these stipuladons allow one of the parties, in the case of gross disparity
of responsibMties on the parties, which offers excessive and uajustifiable profits
to one party. The matter of excessive profits must be present at time of making
the contract. A contract, that does not appear to be dishonest when the
contract comes in, but later shows it$eif to be so,. may be adjusted or
terminated based on the stipulation of hardship mentioned in Article 6,
sedtion2. The term "exces$ive" profits means that, according to this article, a
significant difference in value and price or other aspects tihat disturb the
balance in the per[fbrmance and counter-performance, is not sufficient reason
for the canceilation or adjustment of contract. What is required is such gross
imbalance as to shock the feelings of a reasonable person.
Secondly, regarding uajustified profits, these profits must not only be excessive
in their nature, but must also be uajustified. Whether or not this sttpulation is
met wi11 be seen after evaluation of all aspects relevant to the case. Clause {1) of
this article specifically refers to two factors that need special attention.
The first factor is tihat one of the parties has received unfair profits from the
dependence, economic diffTiculties or urgent needs of the other party, or on
account of his extravagance, ignorance, inexperience of unprofessional conduct
at bargaining (sub clause (al).
Similar to the situation where one party is dependent on the other party, a
superior bargaining position that is a result of market conditions alone, is not
sufficient.
The second factor is the pature and purpose of the contract (sub clause (b)).
There are situations where excessive profits are urlj'ustified even when the party
receiving such profits has not misused his superior bargaining position･ ･/,e. ........
::
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wnether such situation has or has not Qccuned often depends on the nature
and purpose of contraet. Therefore, a condition in the contract that is valid for a
very short period that informs abbut faulty goods or services that have been
sold or delivered, - despite this being justified as agent contribution, - may
become substantial at the end of the transaction. Or where the value of the
goods or service$ are not high, this may a¢crue to excessive profits when the
eontributions are insigriifTicant, or conversely, when the value of tihe goods and
services are excessively high. In this case, other factors must be eonsidered, for
instance, ethics in use in business and commerce.
Thirdly, cancellation of the entire contact or of several conditions in the
eontract are, according to this article, subject to the general conditions
regulated in Article 3.14-3.18. However, according to clause (2) of the article,
upon request of the rightfu1 party to cancel, the court may adjust tihe contract
in accordance with reasonable commercial standards in fair transaction.
Similarly, according to clause (3) the party receiving notice of cancellation may
also request adjustment, as long as he･ immediately informs the canceling party
of this request upon recetpt of the cancellation notice, and befbre the eanceling
party has acted in accordance with the said cancellation.
When the parties can not agree on the procedure to be taken, this must be
considered by the court whether the contract should be cancelled or adjusted,
or when adjusted, with what conditions. wnen, upon the notice or thereafter,
the party who has the right to cancel asks fbr adjustment only, then his right to
¢ancel is for[feited. See Artic!e 3.13 {2)･
       '                                                                'Nevertheless, becauSe the condition to cancel is a right, this means thaj the
wronged party is not forced to cancel the contraet. In fact, conversely it can be
recorrfirmed both explicitly or tacitly. Becaitse, if this possibdity is not
regulated, there may arise uncertainties al)out the contract.
Article 3.12 regulates such enforcement by stahng that when the party who has
the right to cancel, either e)rplicitly or irnplicitly confirms the contract after a
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period of time when notice of cancellation is in process, the cancenation of
contract must be disregarded.
This article stipulates that the party who has the right to cancel, rnay explicitly
or tacitly confrum the contract. The tacit confirmation of contract may not be
sufficient, for example when the party with the right to cancel the contract sues
the other party for non-perforrr)ance. A confirmation is acceptal)le only when
the other party knows of the suit of when the court has given its verdict. A
confirmation of contract may also happen when tihe party with the right to
cancel proceeds to act upon the contract witihout using his right to cancel the
contract.
Another case may be where the party with the right to cancel the contract loses
such rights. Article 3.13 states that (1) When the party who has the right to
cancel the contract does so on account of a mistake, but the other party states
that he wishes to continue to perfbrm and further acts uPon the contract, and
this is understood by the cancelmg party, then the contract is considered made
in accordance with the understariding of the other party. The other party must
then make a statement to that effect or ........................; (2) Upon such
statement or perfbrmance of contract, then the right to cancel the contract･wi11
be forfeited and each notice of cancellation prior to this wi11 be invalid.
According to this article, the party at fault may avoid the cancenation of
contract when the other party expresses his wish to perform or clearly acts
according to the contract as understood by the party faulted. The other party's
interest rnay be based on the profits that he gains from the contract, or even in
                                                                    'its adjusted form.
The other party must clearly state that he will per[fbrm or clearly performs the
contract in it$ correct adjusted form upon notice of the manner in which the
faulted party understands the contract. As regards how the other party has
received the inforrnation on faults to understand the conditions of the contract,
depends on the circumstances of the case.
"
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Clause (2) clearly states that as soon as there is a statement by the other party,
or a clear implementation, then the right of the faulted party to cancel the
contract is forfeited and every earlier notification on cancellation of contract
becomes invalid. Corrversely, the other party no longgr has the right to adjust
the contract when the faulted party has not only been given notification of
cancellation but has also acted in accordance with such notification.
Acceptance of contract by the other party, however, does not preclude the
faulted party from suing for damages according to Article 3.18, when he has
sufllered irTeparable Ioss through adjustment of the contract.
                         tt
                                            '10. ThePrincileof"ContraProferentem"inthe!nterretatienof
                                                            'tt Standard Contract
                                                                    ' The interpretation of contract is regulated in Chapter 4 that includes eight
 articles (artiele 4.1 to 4.8}. However, in this paper only those that are not
 regulated in the Indonesian Civi1 Code wi11 be discussed, in order that these
 may act as exarnples for the renewal of the Indonesian contract law. It is also
 because other stipulations are basically already regulated in positive law.
 An irnportant stipulation that has developed in "lex mercatoria" is the
 interpretation of standard contracts. Article 4.6 regulates "contra profetentem
 ' rule" which says that when conditions of contract as proposed by one party are
                          'not.clear, then the interpretation made by the opposing party must be giveri
           '
, One party is responsible for the formulation of a condition of contract, either
 because that party has prepared it himsere or has merely proposed it, perhaps,
 by using standard conditions that have been prepared by someone else. That
 party must then bear the risk of possible vagueness in the formulations used.
 That is the reason why this article says that, when conditions of contract, as
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 proposed by one party are vague, then priority of interpretation will be given to
  that of the opposing party. While the scope of validity of tihis regulation will
  depend on the circumstances in each case; and shortcomings in the conditions
  of the following contract will become agenda items in further negotiations of the
 parties....... '
 Furtihermore, differences of interpretation in the language of the contract, may
 cause disputes in inteinational commercial contracts. Anicle 4.7 stipulates
 that when a contract is drawn in two 6r more lar!guage versions and both are in    tt                                                  tt- force, and when there are differences between the .two versions, then
                                                                     ' interpretation must be made based on the language of the original contract.
 International commercial contraets are often drawn in two or more language
 versions that can reconcile certain points. Sometimes parties clearly mention
 the version in force, for when all versions are equaliy in force tihen the problem
 arises as to how such differences must be resolved. This article, however, does
 not make hard and fast rules, but merely points out that preference should be
 given to the original version used in the contract, or, when the original is drawn
 up in ditferent lariguage version, to eitiher one of the versions.
 A situation when a different solution is preferred may arise when the parties
 base the contract on in$truments that are widely and internationally used, such
 as INCOTERMS or UCP (The Uniforrn Customs and Practices on Documentary
 Credits}. In the case when differences occur in other versions that are used by
 the parties, then the other version may be used, if this is clearer.
 '                '
                                              ' Article 4.8 stipulates that when the parties in the contract are in disagreement
 on a condhion that is irnportant to the rights and 'responsibvaties of each, then
 a condition more appropriate to the circumstance must be proposed.
 In order to decide on what is the more proper condition, attention must be given
 to the fo11owing factors, among others: {a) the wishes of the parties; (b) the
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nature and purpose of contract; (c) good faith and fair dealing, and (d)
properness.
Articles 4.1 - 4.7 is concerned with the interpretation of contract in its strictest
sense, namely how to properly deeide on the meaning of conditions of contract
that are found to be vague. This anicle refers to problems related to the
thinking process, i.e. implicit conditions. Implicit conditions or gaps wi11 occur
when, after the closure of contract, a problem occurs that has not been
regulated in the contact, either because the parties did not want to regulate it
or they did not expect this to happen. In several cases on implicit conditions or
gaps in contract, the Principles offer ways to resolve the problem.
See, for example, Article 5.6 (Stipulation on the Quality of Perfbrmance), 5.7
(Stipulations on Price), 6.1.1 (Tirne of Performance), 6.1.4 (Request for
Perfbrmance), 6.1.6 (Place of Perfbrmance), and 6.1.10 (Non specified curreney).
See also, in general Article 5.1 on implicit responsibhities. But, oven when
there are additions, or "stop-gap" conditions, or when general conditions are not
applicable, or these regulations do not provide any correet solution to the
situation as expected by the parties, or by (he special nature of the contract,
then this article may be validated.
Tacit conditions tihat are proposed, according to this Article, must be
appropriate to the case concerned. To determine what is meant by "propeff,
attention must flrst be given to the wish of the parties, which can be deduced,
among other factors; from conditions that are spechically stated in the
contract, or that are made before negotiations, or through the behaviour of each
       'after the signing of contract.
                            'In cases when the wishes of the parties can not be determined, then the
                                   'condition proposed may be determined by the nature and purpose of contract,
based on the princtples of good faith and fair dealing and properness.
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1 1. The Princi le to Honour Contracts in Hardshi
Ari Anicle that is important in the Chapter on the Perfbrmance of Contract is
the stipulation on the Situation of Hardship. This must be differentiated from
"Force Majeur" which is regulated in the Chapter concerning Non-Perfbrmance.
Regulations on Hardship are found in Article 6.2.1 to 6.2.3.
Article 6.2.1 stipulates that, when a perfbrmance of contract becomes heavier
                                                      'for one party, tihat party is, nonetheless, stM bound to perfbrm his promise and
is subject to the stipulations on hardship. This stipulation identifies two main
points, namely {1) the binding nature of a contract as a general rule; and (2) the
change ofrelevant circumstances that is acceptable only in exceptional cases.
Firstly, the airn of this article is te clarify that, as a result of tihe validity of the
general princtples regarding the binding nature of a contract {see Article 1.3.),
perfbrmance of contract must, as far as possible, be implemented, regardless of
the weight of burden on the pembrming party. In other words, although one of
the parties may suffer great losses rather than earn the expected profits, or
when the pembrmance of tihe contract becomes insignificant for that party, yet
conditions of contract must in all circumstanees be honoured.
Seeondly, the princlple of the binding nature of a contract is, however, not
absotute. Whenover situations occur thal cause fundamental changes in the
balance of contract, then those are ･exceptional situations, which in the
Principles is termed "hardship", as wi11 be explained in the ensuing articles of
this section.
The phenomenon of hardship is well known in several legal systems, but is
hidden behnd other concepts such as frustration of purpose, Weofall der
Geschafisgrundiage, imprevist'on, ecoessiva onerosita sqpravenvta, etc. The term
hardship is chosen because this term is widely known in international trade
and is confirmed by irs inclusion in several international clause$, which are
termed as "hardship clauses".
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Article 6.2.2 defines that hardship.occurs when an event happens, whereby the
balance of the contract changes fundamentally, either because the costs to
perfbrm the contract have risen, or because the value of the pembrmance of
contract has been reduced for the receitmg party.'Fu therrnor , (a) the
occurrence ofthe event is known by the party damaged only after the closing of
contract; or (b) the event could not be reasonably foreseen by the party
damaged; (c) the event occurred beyohd the control of the party damaged; and
(d) the risks invoived in the event have not been estimated by the party
darnaged. These stipulations regulate the following:
a. DefinitionofHardship
Article 6.2.2. UPICCs defines the term "hardship" as a circumstance where an
event has oocurred that has caused fundamental changes to the contract, that
meet the conditions regulated in sub clause (aj to (d). [[here are 3 {three)
elements in "hardship", namely: (1) a fundamental changg has occurred in the
balance of the contract, or (2) tihe costs of per:fbrming the contract rises, or (3)
the value of the contract to one of the part ies has been reduced.
Firstly, the general principle stipulates that, a change in circumstances does
not effect (change) the responsibility of perfbrrnance (see article 6.2.1).Then, the
stipulation fumher mentions that hardship is applicable only when the change
in tihe balance or equilibrium of the contract is fundamental in nature. A
change in a case may be considered "fundarnental", depending on
circumstances. When performance of contract can be precisely measured in
financial value, then a change of 50% or more from the costs of the original
value of the contract is considered a "fundamental" change.
Seeondly, in practice, a fundamental change in the balance of contract is
reflected in two different but connected ways. First, it is marked by h
substantial increase in costs experienced by one-party to meet his obligations.
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This party is usually the only one who must fulfd non-monetary obligations.
The increase in costs, may, for example happen as a result of a dramatic
increase in raw materials that are important in the production of goods or the
implementation of services, or because of new safety regulations that entail
higher cost of production, or by an abnormal change in the exchange rate of
foreign currency.
Thirdly, the inanifestation of the second kind of hardship is marked by a
substantial decrease in tihe value received by one of the parties, including when
it has corppletely erased all- value to the receiver. [rhe performance may be
monetary or non-monetary in nature. [(1ie substantial decrease of value or a
total failure in the implementation of the contract may occur when a drastic
change has occurred in the market (for instanee as a result of a dramatic
inflationary increase in cost, way above that agreed upon in the contract), or
because of failure of implementation (for example as a result of a prohibition to
build on the desigriated plot of land, or an embargo on received goods meant for
re-export).
Of course the reduction in value in the performance must be measurable
objectively: a mere personal opinion of the receiving party tihat there has been a
reduction of value, is not relevant. As in all cases where there is failure to
achieve the purpose of perfbrmance, this may be considered only when the
purpose is known, or at least should be known by both parties.
b. AdditionalConditionsonHardship.
There are 4 (four) additional "hardship" conditionsjustifial)le by law, and these
are : (1) that the event occurred or is known to have occurred only after the
closing of contract, (2) the event is one that could not have been reasonably
foreseen by the party damaged, (3) the event is bqyond the control of the
disadvantaged party, {4) the risk must not have been expected or assumed by
the disadvantagod.
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Firstly, according to sub-clause {a) of this article, the event that has caused
hardship has occurred, or is known to the party damaged, only after the closure
of contract. When this party has known about this at ime of closure of
contract, he should have made his calculations at the time of contract, and
may, therefore, not use hardship as a reason.
                                     '
Secondly, even when the char!ge in the balance of contract happens after
conclusion of the contract, sub-clause (b} of ihis article clarifies that this
situation wi11 not cause hardship when it should have been reasonahly
anticipated by the party damaged at the time of closure of contract.
Thirdly, based on sub-clause (c) of this article, hardship arises only when the
events that cause hardship are bcyond the control of the party damaged.
Fourthly, based on sub-clause (d) there will be no hardship when the damaged
party had anticipatedlestimated the risks in a changed situation. The word
"estimate" clarifies that the risk may hot have been stated clearly, but follows
                                                            'the nature of the contract. One of the panies that enters into ti speculative
transaction is considered to have anticipated a measure of risk, although the
risk has not been fully realized at time of signing the contract.
c, Hardship is relevant only in Long-term Contracts in not yet
      perfbrrned implementation
Iri line with its nature, hardship becomes relovant only when it is related to
forthcoming perfbrmance.
When fundamental change in the balance of contract occurs after partial
perforrnance, then hardship becomes relevant only to unperfbrmed actions.
Nthough this chapter does not specdically sets aside the possibinty of hardship
on other types of contract, hardship usually becomes relevant in long-term
contracts, when perforrnance by at least one party exceeds a certain ime frarne.
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On the other hand, re!ated to the definition of hardship and that of force majeur
(see Article 7.1.7), accordmg to these Principles, there may occur factual
situations where a case may be considered both a hardship and a case of force
majeur. When such a situation arises, then it depends on the damaged party to
decide which legal action to take, When that party opts for force majeur, then
legal action requires that the clause on non-performance be used. If, on the
other hand, the party uses the reason of hardship, then in the first instance
                                                               'this is aimed at a re-negotiadon in the conditions of contract, so that the
contractisstillvalidalthoughwithchaiigedconditions. '
d. HardshipasaResultoftheLavvRelatedtotheContraet
The defmition of hardship in this Article is more general in nature. International
commercial contracts often include more specific details in this regards. The
parties may consider it more appropriate to adjust the contents of this art]icle in
the light of special situations in special transactions.
What are the legal consequences invoived in this hairdship, is e)rplained in
Article 6.2.3, that determines as follows: (1) At hardship, the party dainaged
may ask for re-negotiation. This request must be put forward imrnediately,
poindng out the basis for such request.; (2) A request for re-negotiation does
not by itself give the right to the party darnaged to cease perfbrmance; (3) When
no agreement has been reached in reasonable time, then either party may bring
the matter to court. (4) When the court decides that there was hardship, the
court may, when considered reasonable: {a) terminate the contract at a
determined date or time period, or (b) change the contract to restore it to a
balanced condition. Based on this decision, the restatement says as fonows:
ii
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(i) TheDamagedPartyhasthe1tighttoaskforRe-negotiation
Because hardship eontains a fundainental change in the balance of
eontract, clause {1) of art]icle 6.2.3. provides in the first instance, the
right to the disadvaritaged party to request re-negotiation. The request,
however, shall be made without undue delay.
A request for re-negotiation is not acceptahle when the contract itseif
already contains a clause that allows automatic change in contract (for
example, when there is a c!ause that allows automatie change in index
given in changed situations).
Nevenheless, re-negotiation is allowed when the clause pertaining to
change, as mentioned in the contract, does not describe the event that
has aetually caused the hardship.
{ii) ReguestforRe-negotiationWithoutUndueDelay
A request for re-negotiation must be made without undue delay from the
time vvhen hardship has occurred (clause (1)), The exact ime when to
request for re-negotiation wil1 depend on each case: for instance, this
[ltlilmem?naMtse3{Mb)ii[;fRtti.tgeng6?E.2W.}.en the situation occurs m phases (see
The damaged party does not fodeit his right to ask for re-negotiation
when he has neglected to act on this immediately. The delay may be due
to allow a more in-depth study on the reasons, and whether or not
hardship has oceurred; and if it has, hour it wi11 affect the contract.
Clause (1} of article 6.2.3. also justifies the disadvantaged party the
obligation to point out the reasons for re-negotiation, to ailow the other
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party to more accurately estimate whether such request for re-
negotiation is or is not reasonable.'A request that is not complete, is
temporary considered unacceptable, except when the basis for hardship
is so evident that it does not need to be specifically mentioned in the
request. Clause (2) of this article determines that the party requesting
re-negotiation is not by itself given the right to cease perfbrmance. This
consideration is based on the special nature of hardship, and to avoid
the misuse of law. The cessation of perfbrmance is justified only in
exceptionalcircumstances. ･ .
(iii) Re-negotiationmustbemadeinGQedFaith
Although this article does not specfically mentions it, however, request
for re-negotiation by the damaged party, as well as the behaviour of both
parties during the process of re-negotiation are subject to the general
principles of Good Faith (Anicle 1.7) and the Obligation to cooperate
(Artic!e 5.3). Therefore, the darnaged party must in all honesty believe
that there has been clear hardship and not request for re-negotiation
only as a tactical maneuver. Also, when once request has been made,
both parties must act in such a way that re-negotiation can be
constnictive, restrain from any disturbance and by prcNiding all
important information.
(iv) Failure to Reach Agreernent to be Brought Before the Court
When both parties have, within a reasonal)le tirne frame, failed to reach
agreement on the changes in the contract or to the changed situation,
then clause (3} of tihis article provides the authority to the parties to
bring the case before the court. [his situation may arise either because
the party who has not been affected, completely disregards the request
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                                         'for re-negotiation, or because re-negotiations haye not reached positive
results, although both parties have approached the issue in good faith
How long one Party must wait before he can appropriately bring this
problem before the court will depend on the complexity of the problem
and the special situation in each case.
According to clause (4) of this article, when a court considers that
hardship has occurred, it may resolve this in different ways. The first
possibraty is to terminate the contract. However, termination of contract
in this ease, depends on the non-performance of one party, where the
outcorne of this decision, as rnentioned before, rnay be different ffom
similar regulations generally applied (Article 7.3.1. et seq). Thus, clause
(4) (a) determines that termination must be made "on the date and on the
conditions" as determined by the court.
                               ''Another possibility is that the court makes changes to the contract in
order to restore the balance of contract (clause (4) (b). In this case, the
court will decide on the fair sharing of losses between the parties. This
action may, or may not cover changes in costs, depending on the nature
of hardship. However, when changes cover costs, then the change does
not necessarily mirror complete improvement resulting from the change
in situation, for example the court will consider the extent of riSks
suffered by one party, and the extent to which the party receiving
             'perf9rmanceofcontractactuallybenefitsfrz)mitsperfbrmance.. '
Clause (4} of this article clearly states that the court may terminate or
change a contract only when deemed appropriate. Indeed, the situation
may show that the solution does not lie in the termination or changes in
contract, but must be found in the re-negotiation efforts by the parties
themseives to reach agreement, or through improvements in the
conditions of contract, that the parties themselves have determined.
1
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12. The Princi le ofAc uittal ofObli ation in Force Ma'eur Situations
 Non-performance happens when one party fails to perfbrm his obligation in line
 with the contract, which ineludes defective or delayed petfbrmance. The first
 form is when "Non-performance" is defined as including all fbrms of
 perfbrmance, from a defective to the complete failure ofperfbrmance. Therefbre,
 it is non-performance when a developer builds one part of the construction
 according to'the contract, but the other part is either defective or late in'
 completion. The second form is taken to lay down the principles, where "non-
 performance" covers the "non-excused" and the "excused".
 Non-performance may be excused by reason of the behaviour of the other party
 in the contract (see Article 7.1.2), (Interference of a third party) and 7.1.3 (on
 the Continuation of Performance), and its funher comrnents, or by reason of
 unexpected external events (Article 7.1.7 (on Force Majeur) and its comments).
 A party does not have the right to sue the other party for damages or special
 treatment on excused non-perfbrmance, -but the party who has not received the
 results of perfomiance has the legal rights to terminate the contract, on
 account of excused or non-excused non-perfbrmance.' See Ar±icle 7.3.1 et.seq,
 and its comments.
                          ' There is no general rule that regulates the accumulation of legal actions. It is
 assumed by this principle that all legal actions which are logically inconsistent
 may be aceumulated. Therefore, in general it is regulated that when one party
 has succeeded to force per fbrmance, will have no right of damages, but, there is
 no reason why one of the parties may not terminate the contract on the basis of
non-excused non-pembrmance and at the same time sue for damages. See
'Article 7.2.5 (Change in legal action), 7.3.5 (The results of termination in
 general) and 7.4.1 {Rights on damages).
The fo11owing discussion will focus on the reason for the party acquitting non-
 perfbrmance because of force-majeur. Article 7.1.7 regulates the situation of
/i
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Force Majeur by stipulating that: (1) non-performance by one party may be
                                                             'excused when that party can prove that non-pembrmance.was caused by an
obstacle beyond his control, and that it could not have been reasonably
expected at time of closure of contract, or that he could not avoid or overcome
the event or its effects. {2) When the obstacle is only of temporary nature, then
the excuse must affect that period only within reason, with due consideration to
the effects made by the obstacle upon the contract. {3) The party who fails to
implement the contract has to notify the other party on the obstacle and its
effects on his capabdities to perfbrm. When the notice is not received by the
other party in reasonal)le time, after the party who has failed to perform has
known or should have known of the obstacle, then the latter will be responsible
for damages as a result of non-receipt of notice.; {4} This Article does not,
however, prevent any of the parties to use his rights to terminate the contract,
refrain from implementing the contract, or ask for payments on interest on
moneys due.
I
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a. TheMeaningofForceMajeur
This Article covers the foundation covered in the system of common law which
is known as tihe doctrine of imstration and the impossibdity of implementation
of contract, which in civil law is known as the doctrine of force majeur.
Otherwise known as "UnmoeglichkeW, etc, this stipulation is not identical with
the two doctrines mentioned earlier. The term force majeur is chosen in t[his
principle, because this terrn is better known in international trade practice, and
in several international contracts is known as the force majeur clauses.
b. The Eflbct of Force Ma'eur on Ri hts and Obli ations
:
/
1
:
This Article does not 1irnit the rights of the parties, who have not received
pembrmance of contract, to terminate the contract, when non-perforrnance is
fundamental in nature. Whatever action has been taken, and where the
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contract is acted on, form elements of excuse for the non-perfbrming party to be
acquitted from obligation on damages.
In several cases, obstacles may stand in the way of the entire pembrmance of
contact, at times this niay be a delaying factor, in which case, according to this
article he may be given additional ime for per fbrmance. It should be noted that
when addhional tirne i$ giyen, which is !onger {or shorter) than the detayed tme
given in crucial cases, this will result in the overall delay in the implementation
                                                  '  '                      t tt                                              tt
This Article should be read in coajunction with Chapter 6, section 2 of the
Principles regulating hardship. See comment 6 on Article 6.2.2.
The defmition of force majeur in clause (1) of tihis article is of a general nature.
Irrternational commercial contracts often include more exact and more detailed
specMcations. In this case, both panies may decide the more correct stipulation
and adapt the contents of this article to the special situation of the special
transaction.
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